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Recently, various proposals have been made to place the oil
industry within the ambit of regulation as a public utility. The authors,
Mr. Verleger, Mr. McClintock, and Mr. Benshoof, examine these pro.
posals from practical and legal points of view. Emphasis is placed on
the constitutional implications of public utility regulation of the oil
industry with respect to the commerce clause and the doctrine of
federal preemption.

PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION OF THE
OIL INDUSTRY: SOLUTION OR ILLUSION?
Philip K. Verleger*
Gregory R. McClintock**
Ward L. Benshoof
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INTRODUCTION

F

ROm the end of World War II to the fall of 1973, the

real price of petroleum products generally declined. If
one subtracted the taxes, and made even a partial allowance
for inflation, gasoline was available to the consumer for less
money in 1972 than in 1946. This was a history which was
unique among commodities. Over the same span of time, the
price of the typical automobile doubled. Whether one selected
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beef, lettuce, refrigerators, tablecloths, or whatever, as one's
standard, almost everything else went up much more.
This was a condition which could not last forever. It
was brought about largely by the success of oil exploration in
finding large deposits, first within the United States:
in Texas, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and in later
years in the remote parts of the world, such as Saudi
Arabia and Nigeria. As demands for energy have exponentially increased, as sources have come to be under direct
control of nations other than the United States, forecasts of
ultimate shortage have abounded. Those forecasts, however,
received little attention until the fall of 1973, when the
Arabian nations imposed an embargo on shipments to the
United States, and shortages developed with dramatic promptness. At roughly the same time, exporting countries raised
prices of their products to levels many times those prevailing
previ *-isly. Under these combined influences, prices for petroleum products rose sharply in the United States and
throughout the world. Even with those increases, the increase in the price of gasoline between 1946 and the present
date is less than the increase in housing cost, the increase in
beef prices or almost anything else. It has been more sudden,
that is all.
Those sudden increases in price have stimulated, quite
understandably, a great deal of public complaint. That complaint, in turn, has resulted in a variety of legislative proposals. One such proposal is to make the oil industry a
"public utility". While, inevitably, there are variations
from bill to bill and proposal to proposal, this suggested
legislation has had some basic characteristics.
There is, first, a general proposal that the oil industry
be treated as a "public utility" rather than enacting a specific
body of legislation adapted to the particular characteristics
of the industry. In order to analyze the effect of that sort of
legislation, it becomes necessary to review the way in which
public utilities are regulated, and to see how such regulation
would apply to the oil industry.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss2/2
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The second common proposal is that some provision be
adopted which would exclude various categories of the industry from "public utility" regulation. For example, retailers, unless controlled by an integrated oil company, are
commonly excluded from such regulation by some proposals.'
1. The following is an initiative proposed by the President Pro Tern of the
California Senate, James R. Mills:
Section 1. Section 216.5 is added to the Public Utilities Code,
to read:
216.5. (a) Petroleum is a depletable resource that is essential
to the economy of the state and the health, safety and well being
of its citizens. It is, therefore, necessary to provide for the regulation of the exploration, production, processing, transportation,
and sale of crude or refined petroleum and petroleum products in
such a manner to assure, insofar as possible, an adequate supply
for all uses and at just and reasonable prices.
(b) Effective July 1, 1975, every corporation or person engaged in the exploration, production, processing, transportation, or
sale of crude or refined petroleum or petroleum products in this
state, and every corporation or person owning, operating, managing, or controlling facilities in this state for such exploration,
production, processing, transportation, or sale, is a public utility
subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission, except
as provided in subdivision (c) hereof.
(c) No corporation or person engaged solely as a service station, wholesale distributor of refined petroleum or petroleum
products, transporter of refined petroleum or petroleum products,
distributor or transporter of asphalt or asphaltic products, petroleum driller, petroleum geologist, engineer or consultant, or engaged only in the sale to the public at retail or refined petroleum
or petroleum products shall be a public utility so long as such
corporation or person is not owned, managed, or controlled by a
corporation or person subject to regulation under subdivision (b)
hereof. The commission may, by regulation or order, exempt from
regulation such other corporations or persons engaged in the
petroleum business to such a limited extent that their regulation
would not be in the public interest, so long as such corporation or
person is not owned, managed, or controlled by a corporation or
person subject to regulation under subdivision (b) hereof.
(d) No corporation or person owning, operating, managing
or controlling the exploration, production, processing, or transportation of crude or refined petroleum or petroleum products, or
corporation or person owned, managed, or controlled by such corporation or person may, in any calendar year, sell to the public at
retail through service stations in this state (other than independent
service stations, including those operating under leases or franchises) more than the greater of the following amounts of gasoline or other motor vehicle fuel:
Gasoline: (1) The total gallonage of gasoline sold by such
corporation or person at retail through service stations in this
state (other than independent service stations, including those
operating under leases or franchises) during the year ending
March 15, 1974; or (2) Ten percent of the total gallonage of gasoline sold by such corporation or person at retail, and sold by such
corporation or person to others for sale at retail, in this state
through all service stations during such year.
Other Motor Vehicle Fuel: (1) The total gallonage of other
motor vehicle fuel sold by such corporation or person at retail
through service stations in this state (other than independent
service stations, including those operating under leases or franchises) during the year ending March 15, 1974; or (2) Ten percent
of the total gallonage of other motor vehicle fuel sold by such corporation or person at retail, and sold by such corporation or person
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The benefits claimed for such legislation are that it
would:
Prevent oil corporations from receiving windfall
profits,
Protect against skyrocketing gasoline prices,
Provide government the information it needs to
predict shortages and take steps to prevent them,
Encourage development of new petroleum resources,
Spur a continuous and reliable supply of gasoline
to service stations,
Allow dealers a means of filing grievances
against suppliers,
Prevent massive service station closures,
Stabilize
crisis.'

unemployment

due to the energy

One may reasonably assume that the legislation is rooted
in a suspicion of oil companies and rested on the belief that
under "public utility regulation" prices will be lower and
service better. This article will explore the legal and practical
problems of this idea.
CTARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION

Because these proposals are general in nature, one has
to look at the characteristics of public utility regulation, as
applied to other industries, to see what it would mean in the
oil industry. The following are the basic ideas typical of
public utility regulation:
to others for sale at retail, in this state through all service stations
during such year.(e) If any provision of this section or the application thereof
to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other provisions or applications of this section which
can be given effect without the, invalid provision or application,
and to this end the provisions of this sdetioh are serverable.
(f) The legislature may- amend this section by two-thirds vote
. . . both houses concurring.
Letter from James R. Mills to The Honorable Evelle J. Younger, Feb. 14,
1974.
2. Press Release by Senator Mills issued Feb. 7, 1974.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss2/2
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Limitation of Competition
Public utility-type regulation is based on a recognition
that particular businesses by their nature will not tolerate
competition. One cannot practically have two gas companies,
two electrical companies, two telephone companies, or two
water companies serving the same plot of ground. Duplication
of pipelines, power lines, and gas pipes is both uneconomical
and inconvenient. In the case of trucking, the fear seems to
have been that" cutthroat" practices would erode the economic
basis for the industry.
Public utility regulation involves the deliberate acceptance of a certain amount of monopoly and the regulation of
that monopoly. It is an essential principle of such a regulation that no more companies will be allowed in a particular
area of service than can be profitably operated. The vehicle
for controlling the number of competitors is most commonly
known as the "certificate of convenience and necessity".
The threat of withdrawal of such a certificate is the primary
tool available to the commission to deal with the utility
which is reluctant to give adequate service. A request for
such a certificate is the tool by which a new company enters
a particular regulated field.
Regulation of Rates and Practices
With utilities, the typical public utilities commission is
directed to determine and fix ". . . by order, the just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, classifications, rules, practices, or
contracts to be thereafter observed and enforced." ' The authority granted extends not only over rates, i.e., prices, but
"practices" and "contracts". It is the general practice of
public utilities commissions in fixing rates: (a) to establish
a rate base--a valuation of the property owned by the public
utility which is useful and used in its public utility business;
(b) to ascertain the necessary operating expenses of the utility; and (c) to fix a rate of return which the utility will be
permitted to earn on a rate base. Establishment of the rate
base is generally the most important part of the operation,
3. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 728 (West Supp. 1975).
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and the method of valuation is critical to the establishment of
the rate base.4
Rate determination has its effects in other areas. In
general, a prudent public utility obtains the approval of the
commission before entering into any substantial contract.
The practical reason is that, without such approval, there
is a danger that the costs involved may not be included as costs
for rate fixing purposes. And, typically, before it acquires,
disposes of, or encumbers property to be used in its business,
it must have permission.'
How would these requirements be applied in the oil business, and what are the legal problems involved ? In general,
the certificate requirement means that any company proposing to do business as a railroad, gas company, electric corporation, water company, telephone company, or the like has to
apply for a certificate from the public utilities commission
before it may do business. Similarly, it must also apply if
it proposes to extend the area in which it will do business.
The making of such an application generally requires a
showing that the area in question is not adequately served
by existing certified utilities.'
DIFFICULTIES IN REGU-ILATING THE OIL INDUSTRY

It is not generally realized by proponents of public
utility-type regulation for the oil industry that a principal purpose of public utility regulation is to protect existing industry
from competition. Such protection is a basic part of the
statutory and case law that becomes applicable under such
legislation. For example, it has been stated:
The commission ordinarily should refuse to premit a utility to invade territory occupied by another
utility furnishing adequate s e r v i c e at reasonable
rates; and an existing utility ordinarily should be
afforded opportunity to furnish necessary additional
4. See Comment, Rate- Base For Public Utilities, 8 ARK. L. REv. 105 (1935).
5. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (West Supp. 1975).
6. See Martinez Bus Line, Inc. and Julius Dorman, 50 Cal. P.U.C. 220 (1950).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss2/2

6

Verleger et al.: Public Utility Regulation of the Oil Industry: Solution or Illusi

1975

REGULATION

OF OIL INDUSTRY

or extended service before a certificate is issued to
a competitor."
This concept, which is basic to public utilities law, is so
completely foreign to the situation in which the oil industry
has operated that it is not surprising that its application
will give rise to extraordinary problems. One may start with
the production of oil.
Regulation of Production
If a certificate of convenience and necessity is required
before one is allowed to drill in an oil field, the simple task
of processing such certificates would be a considerable task.
There are hundreds of producing companies and individuals
in each producing state. Furthermore, if such certificates
were required, a radical revision in conventional ideas concerning oil and gas rights would be required. In some states,
the owner of land containing a part of an oil field does not
actually own the oil. He has a right to extract oil from his
land, in competition with his neighbor, and the oil belongs
to whoever brings it to the surface first.' In other states, different conceptual schemes prevail, but running through all is
the idea that, unless and until some form of unitization is imposed, everyone develops in competition with others?
Fitting these ideas into a system of public utility regulation, which typically involves a total or partial monopoly
serving an entire area, presents some problems. It might
be argued that such legislation does not contemplate utilitytype regulation of the drilling process. However, the typical
bills thus far reviewed contain no such general exception. The
exceptions, on the contrary, typically exclude particular types
of operation, such as exploration or production, only when
carried on by non-integrated companies. That suggests that
the integrated company would require utilities commission
consent, although whether this would be for each well, each
area, or each field, it is hard to forsee.
7. 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 42, at 1099 (1951).
8. Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 32 P.2d 788, 39 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1935).
9. This is the "Rule of Capture" universally applied. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C.
M IMES,
OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.4, at 50 (1972).
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It is also hard to see how typical utility principles of administration are to be applied to a mixture of regulated and
unregulated companies. The matter is doubly difficult because, if a commission system of controlling prices is to be
attempted, control over costs is essential, and crude costs,
including royalties, are significant. But control over this
cost through the vehicle of a certificate of convenience and
necessity and regulation of royalties is irreconcilable with
the idea of leaving the" independents" unregulated and probably irreconcilable with the basic concepts of applicable
property law, i.e., that each landowner has a right to develop
in competition with adjoining owners and thus should not
have to deal with a quasi-monopoly driller assigned to him by
the commission.
Problems of omission will also arise with respect to offshore operations. A state cannot regulate production, transportation, or other operations in the Outer Continental Shelf
where jurisdiction is exclusively federal."0 The Outer Continental Shelf, however, is likely to be the principal source
of new United States production. Thus, as applied to production, utility-type regulation omits the most significant
probable area of new production, and seems to run counter
to existing property rights.
Regulation of Processing aW Refining
Application of public utility principles is at least as
difficult at the next stage-processing and refining. Every
refinery produces in some degree different products, such as
heavy oils for steamship bunkers and for power plant use;
diesel and stove oil for trucking and for heating; jet fuel for
airplanes both within and without the state; insecticides and
fertilizers for agriculture; asphalt for highways, and
in the manufacture of roofing and asphalt tiles for floors;
and raw materials for plastic manufacture. On each occasion, when someone-who did not make such a product wished
10. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)

(1970).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss2/2
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to embark in the business; on each occasi.on when some
company wished to stop making such a product, presumably
permission would have to be obtained from the public utilities
commission. For again, it is fundamental that a public utility,
in return for a protected market, has an obligation to continue
to serve.
Regulation of Marketing
Regulatory problems would also exist at the marketing
stage. If a certificate were to be required for every gas
station, the administrative burden w o u 1 d undoubtedly be
enormous. It would involve the commission in countless
neighborhood wrangles presently decided by local zoning authorities. The authority to decide whether or not a gas station
(or a refinery) should be built in a given neighborhood, under
generalized public utility regulation, would be transferred
from the local city council to the state public utilities commission. Moreover, the notion of giving each station operator
a service area-a sort of protected empire-like the gas company or the Edison Company, does not really seem to fit. But
that is what it means, to make each a public utility, without
being more specific. How that can be done consistently with
exemptions for "independent" dealers is a puzzle.
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

It needs to be emphasized that there is no experience in
the United States of an attempt to treat as a utility a
business with this sort of complexity. The telephone company, the gas company, the water company, and the trucking
and railroad industries are essentially one-product operations.
This would be something new.
Let us assume, nonetheless, that the idea is tried and
that a certificate of convenience and necessity is required
for each oil well, each collection network, each refinery, and
each gas 'station, and that similarly, state commissions attempt to regulate the price of crude oil and each product. The
central legal question which arises is that of authority. Specifically, the problem is whether or not the state has the power
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975
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to require a certificate of convenience and necessity for each
stage of the petroleum business or otherwise so to regulate I
In answering this question, one needs to have the flow
of petroleum in mind. Production, refining, and sale are
not normally confined to a single state. For example, probably fifty percent of the crude used in California comes from
out of state. That crude is blended at a refinery with crude
from California. The products of that refinery may move out
of California into Nevada, New Mexico, Hawaii, or elsewhere.
Products will be used by airplanes and trucks in interstate
commerce. The equipment of the refinery does not distinguish
between products which will be consumed in California and
products which will be consumed elsewhere: the gasoline which
is used in Los Angeles or which is transported to Phoenix
comes out of the 'same stream in the refinery. Streams of
interstate and intrastate commerce are totally mixed.
The whole process is continuous. When the Alaska pipeline to Valdez is completed, tankers will leave daily to bring
products down to southern and northern California, to discharge those products, and to return. Likewise, products will
flow in a steady stream out of the refinery, some to California
users and some elsewhere. This flow is undoubtedly interstate commerce. For example, in Mumson v. Richfield
Oil Corp., the court held that Richfield's sale of petroleum
products to lessees of its service stations for resale to
interstate travelers was not local but rather an activity of
interstate commerce. The court stated: "A nationwide business is not deprived of its interstate character merely because it is built upon local sales contracts." 12
In Deep South Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission,3
a small gas producer, operating solely within the state of
Texas, sold all of its products to the Texas Gas Corporation,
which in turn made retail sales both within and outside the
state. Deep South maintained that its sales were local in
nature and that it was not engaged in interstate commerce
11. 91 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
12. Id. at 172.
13. 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957).
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so as to subject it to the Federal Power Commission's juris-

diction. The court disagreed noting that the intrastate sales
made at the wellhead were "immaterial," and did not
"affect the essential interstate nature of the business.' 4
Given the interstate (indeed, even international) character of the oil industry, regulation by the state becomes affected
with constraints arising from the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. The operation of this provision
has been described by the Supreme Court as follows:
A State is also precluded from taking any action
which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States. It is
immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance....

These principles of limitation on State power apply to all State policy no matter what State interest
gives rise to its legislation. 5
A state, even in the absence of action in the field by
the federal government, is without authority to regulate
businesses engaged in interstate commerce when such regulation imposes substantial burdens upon and leads to a disruption of commerce. This is no less true where a state purports
only to regulate intrastate activities for it is the interstate
effect which is controlling. 6 In addition, the proscription
against state regulation is especially strong where such action
touches matters where uniformity is essential. Indeed, the
criteria of uniformity is often held to mark the limits beyond
which state power may not reach. 7 At the purchase end,
the petroleum business would appear uniquely to fit this
criteria. There is no way that a company can purchase crude
oil in Alaska at one price for California and at a different
price for Washington. Furthermore, there is no way that the
state of Washington can regulate the price of products in
14. Id. at 887. See also Eureka Pipeline Co. v. Hallahan, 252 U.S. 265, 271-72
(1921); Lone Star Producing Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 208 F. Supp. 85, 89
(E.D. Tex. 1962); Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n, 125 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1964).
15. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
16. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), aff'd 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1034 (1973).
17. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946).
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Seattle while leaving uncontrolled the price paid in Alaska.
The decision as to whether or not a particular state regulation
unduly burdens interstate commerce rests upon the facts of
each individual case. Several decisions suggest that wellhead
to gas station regulation of petroleum products would be an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
In Federal Power Commission v. Corporation Co'mmission of Oklahoma,'8 a state commission, finding the price of
gas to be wastefully low, purported to set a minimum price at
which gas could be sold at the wellhead, the minimum price being significantly higher than current contract rates. The court
found that such action offended the commerce clause on
several grounds. First, by purporting to fix the price of a
commodity which moved in interstate commerce, the state
had placed unconstitutional conditions on that movement."
Second, the court found that such regulation further burdened
interstate commerce in that it jeopardized the interstate
supply of natural gas.
Oklahoma is the third largest gas producing state in
the nation. It supplies approximately nine percent
of the total domestic gas sold in interstate commerce.
The Record confirms the dependency of the interstate market on natural gas produced in Oklahoma.2
Thus, the court found that Oklahoma's price scheme would
have the effect of "withdrawing a large volume of gas from
an established interstate current" and thus imposed an unconstitutional burden on commerce. 2 ' Finally, the court
noted that Oklahoma's regulation of the price of gas at the
wellhead would have the further effect of "indirectly fixing
prices to interstate consumers" in violation of the commerce
clause. 2
That it is beyond a state's powers to regulate the price
paid by interstate consumers is well settled. In Public Util18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

362 F.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
533.
535.
533.
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ity Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., the state
of Rhode Island purported to apply its rate structure to sales
of electricity made by a local utility to a Massachusetts utility.
The Supreme Court held that it could not. In Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seeling, Inc.,' the Supreme Court invalidated a New
York statute that prohibited a dealer from bringing in milk
from out of state that had been purchased for less than the
minimum price fixed by statute.
Nor may the state accomplish the same result by indirect
methods. In PolarIce Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,"
the state of Florida attempted to regulate milk prices by requiring local dealers to purchase milk from intrastate sources
before they looked beyond Florida's borders for the sources of
their milk. The Court held that the exclusion of foreign milk
from the local milk market was an undue burden on interstate
commerce, which could not be justified as an economic measure
or as a health measure designed to insure the existence of a
wholesome supply of milk. The Court said, "Florida has no
power 'to prohibit the introduction within her territory of
milk of wholesome quality acquired [in another state] whether at high prices or at low ones'." 2
A recent example of state regulation unconstitutionally
burdening interstate commerce can be seen in Baltimore Shippers & Receivers v. Public Utilities Commission of California.27 In that case the California Public Utilities Commission
attempted to establish minimal rates to be charged by motor
carriers within certain commercial zones in the state. Plaintiff, an interstate shippers association, claimed that the state
could not constitutionally require it to pay such rates on the
basis, inter alia,that such regulation was void under the commerce clause. The court, noting the increased costs such rates
would impose upon plaintiff, held that" [A] ccordingly, there
can be no doubt that the rate regulation by the State of Calif28
ornia would result in a substantial burden on commerce."
23. 273 U.S. 83 (1921).

24. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
25.
26.
27.
28.

375 U.S. 361 (1964).
Id. at 377.
268 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Calif. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 583 (1967).
1& at 845.
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Such a burden was sufficient in itself to void the regulation,
but the court continued on to note testimony in the record
"that the increase in costs would result in a drying up of
some of the traffic and an impairment of the ability of some
out-of-state producers to compete in the California market. 2
This, held the court, was unconstitutional. "The commerce
clause clearly protects interstate commerce from actions by
any state which result in an unreasonable disruption of the
free flow of commerce."3 0
Under these and other authorities, state regulations
which attempt to directly influence prices which an interstate purchaser must pay or the costs and expenses he must
bear are invalid. The commerce clause, as noted in the Baltimore Shippers case, places a premium on the free flow of
commerce across state lines. Local regulations which disrupt
this flow are difficult to justify, especially where it is apparent that uniformity is necessary.
Today, there can be little doubt that a strong policy exists
at the federal level of our government which recognizes the
dependence of certain areas of this nation upon the oil producing states and the need to assure adequate distribution
with respect to crude oil and its refined products from one
area to another.3 Comprehensive regulation of the oil industry by each individual state, where different prices are
fixed for each state, where financing is regulated differently
by each state, and where different standards for physical
equipment would be required by each state would tend to halt
the flow of interstate commerce. Such regulation closely resembles the situation in Souther-n Pacific Co. v. Arizova.Y
There the Court held Arizona's regulation of train length to
be unconstitutional as a serious impediment to the free flow of
commerce in the presence of a strong national interest "in an
adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation
service..." 3 ' Similarly, in TranscontinentalGas Pipe Line
29. Id. at 846.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
See 39 Fed. Reg. 1931-49 (1974).
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Id. at 783-84.
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Corp. v. Hankenuack Meadowlands Development Commission,34 the Third Circuit struck down a state administrative

agency's decision denying plaintiff permission to build a
natural gas plant on the basis that such a decision amounted
to an unwarranted burden on interstate commerce in view of
"the needs of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area
for the adequate and efficient supply and delivery of natural
gas. 13
If, as is indicated here, the local commission cannot regulate the price at which crude is acquired outside the state; cannot regulate the price of local crude purchased if used for
export; and equally cannot control the movement of a refinery
product out of state, the power to regulate at all falls into
serious doubt. Since the refinery's output is shared between
foreign and domestic commerce, and foreign commerce cannot be restricted, the refinery retains at all times the power
to ship the entire output outside the state. That leaves little
left of an obligation to serve the local market. Moreover, since
the cost of raw material is in any event largely outside local
control, little remains of the power to control prices. This
is a difficulty with utility-type control that would obtain at
any time. At the present time, there are other difficulties.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF OIL INDUSTRY REGULATION

Since enactment of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, various aspects of this nation's economy, including the
oil industry, have been subjected to numerous phases of price
control. This control expired, in large part, on April 30,
1974. However, in November of 1973, Congress passed the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973"e which resulted
in subjecting the oil industry to continuing controls in two
areas-price and allocation of supplies. In enacting this legislation, Congress found that a "national energy crisis" existed, the effective and efficient resolution of which required
"prompt action" by the executive branch of the federal gov34. 464 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1972).
35. Id. at 1363.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 751 (Supp. III, 1973).
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Accordingly, the President was instructed to
"promulgate a regulation providing for the mandatory allocation of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and each refined petroleum
product . . . at prices specified in . . . such regulation.'""
With respect to such regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 755(b) (Supp.
III, 1973) provides:
The regulation under section 753 of this title
and any order issued thereunder shall preempt any
provision of any program for the allocation of crude
oil, residual fuel oil, or any refined petroleum product established by any State or local government if
such provision is in conflict with such regulation or
any such order."
Acting under the authority of this legislation, the Federal
Energy Office promulgated a series of regulations on January
15, 1974, designed to control the price and allocation of crude
oil and its products." Coverage of these regulations is comprehensive. With limited exceptions, they are applicable to
all crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products
produced in, refined in, or imported into the United States.
The control imposed is thorough. Among the general
provisions, each supplier's "allocable supply" is defined'
and maintenance of excessive inventories is proscribed."
Wholesalers are declared to be entitled to receive amounts
of petroleum proportional to volumes received in certain
base periods, and suppliers are obligated to provide s u c h
wholesalers with amounts equal to a prescribed formula."
Should these levels need readjustment to deal with fluctuation
in the marketplace, seasonal demand, or other similar factors,
that is also provided for." To meet "hardships" experienced
by wholesale purchasers and end-users, "set-aside" programs
are established within each state to be administered as temporary relief by state officials."
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

15 U.S.C. § 751(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1973).
15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
15 U.S.c. § 755(b) (Supp. III, 1978).
See 39 Fed. Reg. 1931-49 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 1933 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 1936 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 1933 (1974).
39 Fed. Rep. 1934 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1974).
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After establishing the above general provisions, detailed
regulations are prescribed for the control of refinery yield
and the allocation of crude oil, propane, butane, motor gasoline, middle distillates, aviation fuels, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, and other products. 6 Reporting and
accounting practices are mandated with respect to all these
programs.
In addition to controls regarding the distribution of
crude oil and refined products, it was determined by Congress
that a successful allocation program necessitated price controls.47 Thus, as an integral part of the federal program, regulations were promulgated which prescribe in great detail
what a producer, refiner, reseller and retailer might charge
for his product.4" Rents on leased real property used in the
retailing of gasoline are also controlled.4"
Altogether, the program of the Federal Energy Office
effects a system of regulation over the oil industry that
would take much more than the above brief summary to fully
describe. IEowever, from the general provisions outlined
above, it is at least apparent that the federal scheme of regulation is sweeping. In its essentials, the program controls the
manner in which crude oil and its refined products are to be
distributed among the various segments of the oil industry,
the amounts of such distribution, and the prices that might
be charged at almost every level.
Given the nature of the current federal system of controls,
there would not seem to be any conceivable manner in which
a state utilities commission could constitutionally purport to
regulate the prices charged by the oil industry in its production, refining, and retailing operations. Two governmental
bodies quite obviously cannot fix separate prices for the same
commodity. In Federal Power Commission v. Corporation
0 the state of Oklahoma purported
Commission of Oklahoma,"
to fix minimum prices for natural gas at the wellhead. This
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

39 Fed. Reg. 1939-49 (1974).
See H.R. REP. No. 531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973).
39 Fed. Reg. 1940-43 (1974).
39 Fed. Reg. 1944 (1974).
862 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
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action was taken despite the fact that the Federal Power
Commission had its own rate regulation in effect covering the
same producers. Noting the fact that differing prices -set by
federal and state authorities would place producers in a position of being unable to comply with both regulatory schemes,
the court held: "Where such a situation obtains, state regulation is preempted.'""
In Case v. Bowles," a question was presented as to whether or not the sale of timber on certain state-owned lands in
Washington was controlled by the Federal Emergency Price
Control Act, and regulations promulgated thereunder, or
by provisions of state law. Specifically, the Washington
Constitution provided that such sales were to be made "at
An auction was
a public auction to the highest bidder."5
accordingly held and a bid received which exceeded the
maximum price allowable under the federal regulatory program. Suit was brought by the Federal Price Administration to enjoin consummation of the sale. In granting this
relief, the court held that, inasmuch as Congress had subjected the sales of all commodities to federal authority, the
state of Washington was without power to enforce a conflicting law. "4 In the area of rent controls, it has also been
often held that federal regulation of this subject preempts
any -state legislation on the matter.5
With respect to the oil industry, the federal government
provides for the price at which crude oil and refined products might be sold. Because of the supremacy of this law,
the -states axe simply without any constitutional authority
to attempt to set separate prices on the same commodity,
whether under the guise of public utility regulation or other56
wise.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 540.

327 U.S. 92 (1946).
WASH. CONsT. art. 16, § 2.
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102-03 (1946).
See e.g., United States v. Beatty, 88 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Iowa 1950), nodilied and af 'd, 191 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1951); Lovett v. Bell. 30 Cal. 2d 8,
180 P.2d 335 (1947); Hunt v. Gilmore, 98 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1950); Farmer's
Gin Co. v. Hayes, 54 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Okla. 1943), where federal price
controls apply to cotton ginning industry, a state cannot fix rates for
such services.
56. See cases cited note 55 eupra.
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Indirect regulation similarly directed would meet the
same fate. It is established that state laws may not be administered in such a way as to obstruct or defeat clearly
expressed federal policy." A pertinent decision in this regard is Public Utilities Commission of California v. United
States." There, in an apparent attempt to deal with the
rate-cutting practices of California carries in competing for
the heavy volume of military traffic in the state, the California Legislature amended Section 530 of the Public Utilities
Code to extend rate regulation to carriers dealing with the
federal government. However, the Supreme Court found
such attempted regulation to be in conflict with federal
policy expressed in statutes and regulations favoring rates
individually negotiated between the Government and a carrier. Noting that such a conflict "seems to us to be as clear
as any that the Supremacy Clause . . . was designed to resolve", the Court held the attempted regulation void."
It is difficult to conceive of any action a state public
utilities commission could take with respect to regulation
of the oil industry that would not have an impact upon the
federal policy of price and 'supply control. To the extent
that, on such matters as transfer of property and issuance
of securities, such regulation would increase costs, discourage investments, limit expansion, or otherwise hamper
traditional operations of the industry, such action would
certainly tend to have an adverse effect upon amounts of
crude oil and refined products available and the cost of the
same, both of which the federal government seeks to control.
Such: frustration of a national policy by application of state
law defeats the supremacy of federal law and is contrary to the
Constitution.
The material above was written in light of the present
situation, i.e., one where petroleum allocations and petroleum prices are comprehensively regulated by federal authority. If petroleum products become more commonly avail57. Barton v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 703 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
58. Id. at -544. .
59. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369 (1969); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
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able, it is to be anticipated that,in the not very distant
future, the federal system will be less comprehensive. This
does not mean, however, that the states will then be constitutionally free to go forward with one or another of these hybrid
public utility proposals. In fact, there are powerful reasons
for suggesting that the states are not free to so legislate.
In the short term, a decision by the federal authorities no
longer to regulate petroleum prices would have as its predicate
a determination that such regulation is no longer necessary.6"
By the terms of the Act, allocation remains in effect, except
that the President may terminate it on a finding that it is unnecessary. The provisions as to termination state:
If at any time after November 27, 1973, the
President finds that application of the regulation
under subsection (a) of this section to crude oil, residual fuel oil, or a refined petroleum product is not
necessary to carry out this chapter, that there is no
-shortage of such oil or product, and that exempting
such oil or product from such regulation will not
have an adverse impact on the supply of any other
oil or refined petroleum products subject to this
chapter, he may prescribe an amendment to the regulation under subsection (a) of this section exempting such oil or product from such regulation for a
period of not more than ninety days.6
Termination, then is allowed only if allocation is not
"necessary to carry out this Act." The purposes of this
act are as follows :
Sec. 751. (a) The Congress hereby determines
that(1) shortages of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and
refined petroleum products caused by inadequate
domestic production, environmental constraints, and
the unavailability of imports sufficient to satisfy
domestic demand, now exist or are imminent;
(2) such shortages have created or will create
severe economic dislocations and hardships, includ60. 15 U.S.C. § 753(g) (2)
61. 15 U.S.C. § 753(g) (2)

(Supp. III, 1973).
(Supp. III, 1973).
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ing loss of jobs, closing of factories and businesses,
reduction of crop plantings and harvesting, and curtailment of vital public services, including the transportation of food and other essential goods; and
(3) such hardships and dislocation jeopardize
the normal flow of commerce and constitute a national energy crisis which is a threat to the public
health, safety, and welfare and can be averted or
minimized most efficiently and effectively through
prompt action by the Executive branch of Government.
(b) The purpose of this chapter is to grant to
the President of the United States and direct him to
exercise specific temporary authority to deal with
-shortages of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined
petroleum products or dislocations in their national
distribution system. The authority granted under
this chapter shall be exercised for the purpose of
minimizing the adverse impacts of such shortages
or dislocations on the American people and the domestic economy. 2
Moreover, termination is effective only for a ninetyday period. It must then be re-enacted. The comprehensive
nature of the purposes, plus the short period of termination
(really suspension) suggest that federal control is intended
to be exclusive until August 28, 1975. It is hard to imagine
setting up a state system to operate only during a ninetyday period of suspension. So, effectively, pre-emption is
complete until August, 1975 (or until such later date as the
Act may be extended). What then?
EQUAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS OF REGULATION

There remains the classic doctrine that, to be regulated
as a utility, an industry must be to some extent "affected

with a public use." Treatment as a "public utility" comprehends regulation more drastic t ha n otherwise exists.
Whether a person may or may not go into the business of
being a public utility is regulated; whether the public util62. 15 U.S.C. § 751 (Supp. III, 1973).
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ity may issue the stock which is the essential precedent
to acquiring capital; what property the public utility may
own, by or sell; at what price its products are sold, and
what services it renders are all subject to regulatory determination. The authority of the commission is nearly as
great as in the case of complete government ownership. The
difference is that in a private utility, risks are borne by the
stockholders.
Historically, the courts have consistently recognized that
this form of drastic regulation may not be imposed upon
everyone. Running through the cases from 1900 to the present,
there has been the concept that, in order to be so regulated
it is necessary that the utility in some sense "dedicate" its
business to a "public use," or that the business be "impressed
with a public use."6"

The vitality of this concept has been questioned64 but it
continues to be applied. 5 To attempt to analyze the cases
on this topic at length would be beyond the scope of this
article. For our purposes, it is enough to note that a legislative scheme which made some oil producers public utilities,
but not others, fixed the prices of -some refiners, but not
others, and required certificates of convenience and necessity
63. See Tyson & Brother v. Banten, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). On the question of
whether the ice industry in Oklahoma was charged with a "public use", the
Court held otherwise. Newh State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 277
(1932).
In Williams v. Standard -Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929), the Court
was presented with the question of whether the retail sale of gasoline was
so affected with a public interest as to justify a state statute which purported to fix the price for such sales. It was held that it was not. Whether
a 1929 case will apply today is, of. course, always a question. But in Pulitzer
Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 94 F.2d 249, 251
(D.C. Cir. 1937), the United States Court of Appeals for- the District of
Columbia denied public utility status to radio broadcasting companies,
observing that:
We have never said that a radio broadcasting station is a public
utility in the sense in which a railroad is a public utility. Generally
speaking, that term comprehends any facility employed in rendering
quasi public service such as waterworks, gas works, railroads, telephones, telegraphs, etc. The use and enjoyment of such facilities
the public has the legal right to demand; but its right to the use
and enjoyment of the facilities of a privately owned radio station
is of a much more limited character.
64. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 54 Cal. 2d 419, 354 P.2d
4, 6 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1960), relying on Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
65. City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal. App.
2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1962) and Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 68 Cal. 2d 406, 488 P-2d 801, 67 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968) are cases cited by the Richfield court.
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for some, but not others, would in any event probably be unconstitutional. 6
THE FULL EMPLOYMENT ACT

One notes finally that, in a somewhat different way,
Congress may effectively have legislated the old limits on
the power to impose "public utility" type regulation into
statute. The critical statute is The Full Employment Act
which provides:
The Congress declares that it is the continuing
policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means consistent with
its needs and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy, with the assistance
and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor,
and State and local governments, to coordinate
and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources
for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a
manner calculated to foster and promote free cornpetitive evterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment,
for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to
promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. (emphasis added)."'
The policy of fostering "free competitive enterprise" is
repeated in Section 1023(a) which directs the Council of
Economic Advisors "to formulate and recommend national
66. Up to the present, legislation which has provided for rigid regulation of
certain people in a given business while completely exempting others, has
generally met with disapproval. Thus, long ago in Cotting v. Kansas City
Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901), the Court struck down as a
denial of equal protection a statute which fixed prices at stockyards doing
a certain volume of business but allowed smaller stockyards to operate
freely without price controls. In that case, larger stockyards were characterized by statute as public utilities. The Court found that large and
small stockyards were operating under essentially the same conditions, and
concluded that a discrimination based simply on the quantity of business
done was arbitrary and could not be justified by calling it a classification.
More recently, in Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v.
Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937), the statute which provided for far easier
licensing for mutual insurance company agents than for stock company
agents was upset as a violation of equal protection. And still more recently,
in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), a statute which exempted the
American Express Company from regulations applicable to smaller sellers
of money-orders was-invalidated.,
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1970).
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purchasing power under free competitive enterprise". (emphasis added).
The Full Employment Act has not been the subject of
significant litigation but was the model upon which the
National Environmental Policy Act 8 was based, and the
numerous cases under the latter act leave no doubt as to the
enforceability of such policies.
CONCLUSION

The manufacturing and use of sources of energy comprize virtually the entire modern economic structure. Comprehensive treatment of suppliers of energy as "public utiliities" would leave very little left of "free enterprise." It
would seem, for a variety of reasons, that such attempts at
regulation go far beyond the limits of state power.

68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
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